\u0110i\u1ec7n m\u1eb7t tr\u1eddi v\u00e0 \u0111i\u1ec7n gi\u00f3 c\u00f3 gi\u00e1 th\u00e0nh d\u1ea7n r\u1ebb h\u01a1n, n\u00ean Vi\u1ec7t Nam v\u00e0 Th\u00e1i Lan s\u1ebd gi\u1ea3m nhu c\u1ea7u mua \u0111i\u1ec7n t\u1eeb L\u00e0o, d\u1eabn \u0111\u1ebfn c\u00e1c d\u1ef1 \u00e1n \u0111\u1eadp th\u1ee7y \u0111i\u1ec7n l\u1edbn \u1edf L\u00e0o tr\u1edf n\u00ean kh\u00f3 c\u00e2n \u0111\u1ed1i ngu\u1ed3n thu -> c\u00f3 th\u1ec3 c\u00e1c \u0111\u1eadp \u0111ang d\u1ef1 t\u00ednh s\u1ebd kh\u00f4ng huy \u0111\u1ed9ng \u0111\u1ee7 v\u1ed1n \u0111\u1ec3 x\u00e2y.<\/p>\n
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Nor does Hanoi want to offend Vientiane, where China, with deep pockets, has gained influence at Vietnam’s expense. The result, a development policy specialist with decades of experience in Vietnam suggested to me, is that the Vietnamese government aims to slow walk the Luang Prabang dam project until it dies of unfinanceability.<\/p>\n
Though there’s a certain logic to focusing effort on things one is good at, and surely Vietnamese state companies and their Thai and Chinese counterparts have plenty of experience building and operating big dams, there’s come a point where, even if externalities aren’t considered, big dams no longer make economic sense. The price of solar and wind power generation has fallen so far and so fast in the last decade that big hydro no longer is bankable.<\/p>\n
Southeast Asia generally, and Vietnam in particular, are blessed with abundant solar and wind energy resources. Utility-scale solar projects can be brought to the market in a year or two; utility-scale wind projects take a bit longer.<\/p>\n
Midway through a remarkable refocusing of its power development strategy away from reliance on hydro and coal, Hanoi is eager to cover short-term gaps by purchasing power, perhaps as much as 1500 gigawatt hours,\u00a0perhaps 10 percent\u00a0<\/a>of a projected shortfall,\u00a0from Laos in 2021<\/a>\u00a0and 2022. In the longer term, Laos doesn’t much figure in Vietnam’s energy policy planning.<\/p>\n
I contacted Brian Eyler of the Stimson Center, whose “Last Days of the Mighty Mekong” (Zed Books, 2019) is the go-to book on the river’s present-day tribulations, to ask if he agrees that by churning up consultation activity in the MRC, the Lao government is trying to create an illusion of forward motion towards its vision of Laos becoming the hydro-powered ‘Battery of Southeast Asia.”<\/p>\n
“Yes,” Eyler replied. “In addition to a lack of financing for these projects, an offtaker has yet to appear to purchase power from the dams. None of the dams you\u2019ve mentioned has a power purchase agreement to back it up. It’s mindboggling to see the MRC start the [consultation] process without these key boxes (financing and power purchase agreements [PPA]) checked off. Perhaps the Lao government’s calculus is to use passage [through the multinational consultations] as a way to gather financing and PPAs.<\/p>\n
\u201cMooting these dams now gives an illusion of progress when in actuality all signals point to mainstream Mekong dams being obsoleted in the very near term. Unreliable flows, cheaper alternatives and efficiency gains in key markets like Thailand and Vietnam are greatly reducing the need for power produced from far-flung mega dams. Clearly Laos needs to explore alternative development options.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n